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EUROPEAN UNION ANTITRUST LAW & PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATIONS: THE STRATEGIC CHOICES OF "SOFT"
WEAPONS BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Mary Catherine Lucey*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article highlights the strategic use of antitrust law initiatives other than
formal enforcement decisions by the European Commission (Commission) in
respect of professional associations. Increasing the efficiency and
competitiveness of professional services in the European Union is part of the
strategy voiced by the 2000 European Council in Lisbon to make Europe "the
most dynamic knowledge based economy in the world" by 2010.' This article
argues that, in its efforts to achieve the Lisbon objective, the Commission is
trying to regulate professions to an extent which would not be possible under
their formal enforcement powers.
II. EUROPEAN UNION ANTITRUST LAW
The Treaty on European Union (EC Treaty), which establishes the
European Communities, contains two articles devoted to improving competition
among private economic actors or, to use the Treaty term "undertakings."
Article 81 EC (ex Article 85) prohibits anti-competitive arrangements among
undertakings, which may affect trade among the Member States, and Article 82
* Mary Catherine Lucey, BCL, LLM, Barrister at Law, Law School, University College Dublin,
Ireland. Gratitude for helpful comments is expressed to Professor Imelda Maher, Sutherland
Professor of law, University College Dublin and Mr Giorgio Monti, The London School of
Economics and Political Science.
1. "More efficient and competitive professional services will benefit consumers directly and,
as key inputs for other businesses they will also bring greater productivity to the economy as a
whole, thus contributing to the Lisbon agenda ... ." Communication from the Commission: Report
on Competition in Professional Services, 104, COM (2004) 83 final (Feb. 9, 2004) [hereinafter
Commission Report 2004].
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EC (ex Article 86) prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by one or more
undertakings. 2  The interpretation of these articles is informed by economic,
political and social concerns.3
Article 81(1) EC prohibits "all agreements between undertakings, decisions
by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market ...... 
Typically, a two-stage inquiry is undertaken to evaluate whether the restraint is
anti-competitive in either its object or effect. The first question posed is whether
the object of the arrangement is the restriction of competition. If an objective
assessment of its aims pursued in the given economic context reveals an
anticompetitive object, then a determination of an infringement of Article 81(1)
EC can be made without further analysis. 6 Absent such a finding in relation to
the object, Article 81(1) EC is infringed only if the agreement may produce an
appreciable, 7 actual or potential restrictive/distortive effect on competition.
To this end, account must be taken of the actual economic and legal
context 8 of the restriction including examination of the products/services
covered by the agreement, the relevant market structure and the actual conditions
of its operation.9  In order to ascertain the restriction's effect, the state of
competition in the absence of the particular measure is examined. l According
to European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law, Article 81(1) is not infringed if the
agreement's effect on competition is not significant, "taking into account the
weak position which the persons concerned have on the market .... 11 The
prohibition in Article 81(1) EC does not apply to a restriction that satisfies the
2. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) arts. 81-82
[hereinafter EC Treaty Amsterdam].
3. See generally Joined Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A v. Comm'n,
1974 E.C.R. 223.
4. EC Treaty Amsterdam art. 81 (as in effect 1997) (as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam).
5. Joined Cases 29/83 & 30/83, Compagni Royale Asturienne des Mines SA v. Comm'n, 1984
E.C.R. 1679,9 26.
6. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm'n, 1966 E.C.R. 299,
343; Case 45/85, Verband der Sachversicherer e.V. v. Comm'n, 1987 E.C.R. 405, , 39.
7. Case 5/69, Vblk v. Vervaecke, 1969 E.C.R. 295, 1.
8. Case 56/65, Socit6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.C.R. 235, T
8.
9. Id. at 250.
10. "In order to determine whether or not such clauses come within the prohibition in Article
85(1), it is necessary to examine what would be the state of competition if those clauses did not
exist." Case 42/84, Remia BV v. Comm'n, 1985 E.C.R. 2545, 1.
11. V61k, 1969 E.C.R. 295, 5/7.
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four conditions contained in Article 81(3) EC.12 Until individual notifications
were abolished in May, 2004, by Regulation 1/2003, the Commission could
grant exemptions to notified restrictions for a specified period either with or
without conditions following a detailed examination, and sometimes
"negotiation."
Furthermore, balancing of pro- and anti-competitive considerations under
Article 81(3) EC was the approach the Commission traditionally favored. 13 The
Court of First Instance (CFI) sometimes indicated a similar preference for such
balancing to occur under Article 81(3) EC rather than under Article 81 (1) EC. 14
The Commission may issue Block Exemption Regulations, which exempt
particular categories of agreements from the prohibition in Article 81(1) EC.
Alternatively, Article 82 EC prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by one or
more undertakings if there is a significant effect on interstate trade. A measure
is not an "abuse" if it is objectively justifiable.
The Commission enjoys considerable formal enforcement powers in
relation to violations of EC Treaty Articles 81 and 82. It may receive complaints
about breaches. It has sizeable powers of investigation. These include power to
enter the property of undertakings suspected of a violation 15 and, in some
situations, the power to enter the residences of staff of the undertaking. 16 The
Commission is free to determine that either article has been violated. 17 Its power
to issue orders to violators includes orders that specify cessation of conduct.
For example, the Commission may order a violator to stop exchanging
information. Additionally it may make "any behavioural or structural remedies
which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary to bring
12. A restriction will not infringe Article 85(1) EC if it satisfies all of the following four
conditions of Article 85(3) EC:
It must contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress; It must allow consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit; It must not impose on the undertakings concerned
restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of its objectives; It
must not afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Remia BV, 1985 E.C.R. 2545, 38.
13. White Paper on Modernisation of Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty,
57, Commission Programme No. 99/027 of May 12, 1999, 1999 O.J. (C 132/1).
14. Case T-112/99, Metropole Television (M6) v. Comm'n, 2001 E.C.R. 11-2459, 107; Case
T-374/94, Eur. Night Servs. (ENS) v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 11-3141, 136; Case T-193/02, Piau
v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-209, 101.
15. Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 20, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC).
16. Id. at art. 21(1).
17. Id. at art. 7(1).
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the infringement effectively to an end."' 18 The Commission has power to impose
financial penalties, up to a maximum of ten percent of a violator's annual
worldwide turnover in the preceding business year, on undertakings that
violated, "intentionally or negligently," Articles 81 or 82 EC. 19 In light of these
mighty powers it is, at first glance, surprising that the Commission has not
wholly relied on its formal enforcement powers but looked to informal initiatives
to combat restrictions within the professions. Before examining the possible
reasons for this strategy it is informative to first examine the informal measures.
Prompted by the Lisbon strategy, the Commission has adopted two reports
and commissioned two independent studies on the competitiveness of particular
professions. The first independent report was commissioned from the Institute
for Advanced Studies in Vienna as part of a stock-taking exercise by the
Commission. This research was integral in creating the Commission's first
report titled Competition in Professional Services (Report).20 The second report,
titled Professional Services-Scope for More Reform, was then published in
September 2005. 2 1 Following the reports, in December 2007, an independent
study was undertaken by the Centre of European Law and Politics at Bremen
University on the conveyancing services market.
22
The Commission's first Report examined five types of restrictive practices
of professional associations: (i) price fixing, (ii) recommended prices, (iii)
advertising restrictions, (iv) entry requirements and reserved rights, and (v)
regulations governing business structures and multi-disciplinary practices. The
six selected professions were comprised of lawyers, notaries, accountants,
architects, engineers and pharmacists. Notably, the medical profession was not
included. The Report aimed not just to explain why antitrust policy action was
needed but rather acted pro-actively to set out "a future course of action to
promote the elimination of unjustified restrictions." 24 Four aspects of the Report
are interesting. First, the instruments proposed by the Commission to procure
change, second, the addressees of the initiatives, third, the interests prioritized
and lastly, its attitude towards restrictions on business structures.
18. Id.
19. Id. at art. 23(2).
20. See Commission Report 2004, supra note 1, 14 n.12.
21. Communication from the Commission: Professional Services- Scope for More Reform, at 1,
COM (2005) 405 final (Sept. 5, 2005).
22. Ctr. of Eur. L. & Politics, Univ. of Bremen, Conveyancing Services Market,
COMP/2006/D3/003 (Dec. 2007).
23. Commission Report 2004, supra note 1, 6.
24. Id. 5 (parenthetical omitted).
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First, the Report advocates for various informal measures to be deployed by
the Commission and national antitrust authorities in each Member State.25 The
suggested measures are notable for their lack of legal cogency. They comprise
invitations to entities to voluntarily review their restrictions, discussions with
European organisations of professional bodies and consultations with consumer
organisations. These instruments aim to secure "negotiated" changes to
restrictive practices. Negotiation (in the shadow of the EC articles) is conducted
by the antitrust authority with the restraining entity and with consumers, but does
not deal discretely with the restrained individual. As such, the process is
reminiscent of the discussions between the Commission and notifying parties
that could occur before the abolition of individual notifications in 2004. As of
May 1, 2004, it is no longer possible for parties to transmit an agreement to the
Commission and receive feedback on the compatibility of their arrangement with
Article 81 EC.
The second remarkable aspect is the scale of the desired reform because it
extends beyond the usual addressees and confines of EC Treaty Articles 81 and
82. Articles 81 and 82 EC are specifically addressed to "undertakings" and, in
the case of Article 81, to "associations of undertakings." The term
"undertaking" is not defined by the EC Treaty, but has been interpreted to
include: "every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of its [legal]
status and the way in which it is financed .. ,26 Any activity consisting in
offering goods and services on a given market is an economic activity. 27 The
addressees envisioned by the reports are far broader because they include
national antitrust authorities, other types of national regulatory authorities, the
Member States' legislatures and professional associations.
The second report, adopted by the Commission in 2005, specifically
exhorted national antitrust authorities to engage with national governments and
to collaborate with them. This follows the initial Report's call to governments
and their non-antitrust regulatory entities to examine anti-competitive
restrictions within their control. Consequently, Commissioner Mario Monti even
called on professional associations to propose legislative changes to their
25. EU Regulation 1/2004 obliged every Member State to designate national competition
authorities with responsibility to enforce Articles 81 and 82 EC within their national territory.
Commission Regulation 1/2004, art. 10, 2004 J.O. (Li) 9 (EC).
26. Case C-55/96, Job Ctr. Coop., 1997 E.C.R. 1-7119, 21 (alteration to original text); see
generally Commission Decision 85/615, 1985 O.J. (L 376) 2 (EC) (noting that the EC Treaty's
Article 81 (ex Article 85) was applicable to non-profit-making associations, known as Protection
and Indemnity Clubs, involved in providing marine insurance).
27. Case 118/85, Comm'n v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 2599, 7; Commission Decision 31/149, 1986
(L 230) 1, 99; see Case C-41/90, Hofner v. Macrotron GmbH, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1979, 21, 23.
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national legislative authorities. 28 This wide range of addressees shows that the
application of antitrust policy to professionals is being shaped by informal and
non-transparent interaction among private and public actors.
The third interesting aspect of the Report is its avowed goal of promoting
the "public interest" and the interests of consumers. The focus on "public
interest" is striking because this phrase does not appear in the text of Articles 81
or 82 EC.29 In the Commission's view, "[r]ules must be objectively necessary to
attain a clearly articulated and legitimate public interest objective and they must
be the mechanism least restrictive of competition to achieve that objective." 30
The Report expressly invites national authorities and professional bodies to
consider "whether the existing restrictions pursue a clearly articulated and
legitimate public interest objective, whether they are necessary to achieve that
objective and whether there are no less restrictive means to achieve this." 31
Discussions between the Commission and European organisations of
professional bodies center on "their understanding of the public interest in their
domain and how it could be achieved with more pro competitive mechanisms.
' 32
The Commission pays regard to the interests of consumers or end users. The
Report cites the European Parliament Resolution on regulation and competition
rules which endorses the necessity, generally, of rules:
[I]n particular those relating to the organisation, qualifications, professional
ethics, supervision, liability, impartiality and competence of the members of
the profession or designed to prevent conflicts of interest and misleading
advertising, provided that they give end users the assurance that they are
provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and experience,
and do not constitute restrictions on competition.
33
Input from consumers is specifically sought by the Commission on a
variety of issues including: (i) "opinions on the advantages and disadvantages of
this type of regulation", 3 (ii) "the relationships between levels of regulation and
28. Mario Monti, Comm'r, Eur. Comm'n, Comments & Concluding Remarks of Commissioner
Monti at the Conference on Professional Regulation 15 (Oct. 28, 2003).
29. The terminology of "public interest" is found in the cases dealing with the free movement
of services, for example: Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati e
Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. 1-4165, 37.
30. Commission Report 2004, supra note 1, at 4 (emphasis added).
31. Id. 93 (emphasis added).
32. Id. 95 (emphasis added).
33. Id. 29 (quoting Market Regulation and Competition Rules for the Liberal Professions,
EuR. PARL. Doc. P5 TA0572 11 (2003) (emphasis added).
34. Commission Report 2004, supra note 1, 96.
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economic outcomes ... as well as consumer satisfaction,"35 and (iii) the
definition of best practice. 36  Moreover, the Commission has advocated the
enhancement of "consumer empowerment" by means of mechanisms such as
"active monitoring by consumer associations, collection and publication of
survey based historical data or public announcements of the abolition of
tariffs." 37 This approach aggrandizes the influence of consumers to an extent
that is not required by the EC Treaty under formal enforcement proceedings.
The fourth interesting aspect of the Report is its attitude to restrictions on
professional business structures. It states that restrictions on business structure
are least justifiable if "they restrict the scope for collaboration between members
of the same profession" or in a profession "where there is no overriding need to
protect practitioners' independence" giving the example of architects and
engineers. 38 While it seems to agree that restrictions are more justifiable "where
there is a strong need to protect practitioners' independence or personal
liability", it argues that "alternative mechanisms for rotecting independence and
ethical standards . . ." could be less anti-competitive.
The Commission's views do not wholeheartedly match the jurisprudence of
the ECJ. Before examining particular judgments, it is appropriate to ask whether
inter institutional discord offers a clue as to the attractiveness of the informal
measures. Therefore, the next section analyzes some of the formal decisions of
the Commission and judgments of the ECJ taken under Article 81 EC. The aim
of this examination is to understand the intricacies of applying Article 81 EC
formally and to highlight any disincentives to its application.
III. FORMAL DECISIONS & JUDGMENTS
Unlike antitrust legislation in some Member States,40 neither Article 81 nor
82 EC make any particular provision for professionals. Three aspects of
professionals' services are sometimes cited as reasons to qualify the application
of EU antitrust law.41 The first feature is the asymmetry of information between
consumer and professional. 42  The point is made that where "[p]rofessional
services are 'credence goods' . . .," their quality "cannot easily be judged either
35. Id.




40. Philip Andrews, Self-Regulation by Professions-The Approach Under E.U. and U.S.
Competition Rules, 23(6) EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 281, 281-85 (2002).
41. Commission Report 2004, supra note 1, 124.
42. Id. 9 25.
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by prior observation or, in some markets, by consumption or use." 4 3 The second
feature of professionals' services concerns "externalities" 44 in the sense of
impact on third parties.
45
Thirdly, mention has been made of the public service dimension of some
professionals' services. Sometimes, the restraining entity's regulatory function
is applicable when professional services are regarded as "public goods that are of
value for society in general." 46 The Commission is alive to the "danger that
without regulation some professional services markets might undersupply or
inadequately supply public goods." 4 7 "Restrictive regulations have therefore
been justified as being designed to maintain the quality of professional services
and to protect consumers from malpractice." 4 8 These observations show that
there are arguments in favour of a tempered application of antitrust law to
restrictions on professionals. This reveals a degree of complexity which is not
found in cases involving, for example, a price fixing agreement among
manufacturers.
As a result, rules restricting learned professionals, for instance, restrictions
on professionals' freedom to advertise, to set their own fee structures and to
engage in desired business structures are examined under competition law on a
case by case basis. In Institute of Professional Representatives v. Commission,
the Court of First Instance refused to accept that "rules which organise the
exercise of a profession fall as a matter of principle outside the scope of Article
81(1) EC merely because they are classified as rules of professional conduct by
the competent bodies." 49 This judgment was an appeal from the Commission's
decision in European Patent Institute Code of Conduct.50 In its decision, the
Commission decided that the European Patent Office's (EPO) ban on
comparative advertising and ban on approaching others' clients infringed Article
43. Id.
44. "Externalities are benefits or losses (normally to society as a whole) which are not priced."
Joined Cases C-180/98 & C-184/98, Pavlov v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten,
2000 E.C.R. 6451, 85; see Commission Report 2004, supra note 1, 26.
45. See Commission Report 2004, supra note 1, 26.
46. Examples offered by the Commission "include the correct administration of justice or the
development of high quality urban environments." Commission Report 2004, supra note 1, 27.
47. Id. (emphasis added).
48. The Commission offers examples of licensing restrictions as a means to "preclude
incompetent or poorly qualified practitioners from offering services, while disciplinary procedures
can be used to sanction providers whose quality fails to meet minimum standards." Commission
Report 2004, supra note I, 28 (emphasis added).
49. Case T-144/99, Inst. of Prof'l Representatives v. Comm'n, 2001 E.C.R. 11-1087, 64.
50. Commission Decision 36/147, 1999 O.J. (L106) 14 (EC).
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81(1) EC because of the disadvantages to the immediate consumers, the public
(economy) and the operation of the restraining association.
The Commission desired comparative advertising because it allows
consumers to distinguish between choices and also because it facilitates the
establishment of new operators. 51 In its view, the bans were "not necessary to
ensure professional responsibility, independence or secrecy or to prevent false or
deceptive statements or conflicts of interest and thus to ensure that EPI members
comply with the rules of professional conduct .... ,52 Thus, the cited reasons
were concerned with the public interest and the proper running of the
association.
More interestingly, the Commission decided (after many amendments to the
notified arrangements) that Article 81 (1) EC was not infringed by other restraints
because they were "necessary, in view of the specific context of this profession
in order to ensure impartiality, competence, integrity and responsibility on the
part of representatives, to prevent conflicts of interest and misleading
advertising, to protect P3rofessional secrecy or to guarantee the proper
functioning of the EPO." This list cites non-economic and non-competition
criteria such as public interest type objectives that particularly advantage both
the recipients of the services and the functioning of the restraining body. It is
remarkable that the Institute Code's prohibition on members from charging fees
related to the outcome of the service (a higher fee if application is successful or
lower fee if unsuccessful) did not infringe Article 8 1(1) EC.
This despite the Commission's view that the professionals' merit and the
quality of services are essential elements of competition and that "competition"
among liberal professionals should additionally cover "other elements such as
fees and advertising."5 4  Nonetheless, it decided that "[t]his restriction on
members' freedom of commercial action must be viewed in the context of the
overall system by which the EPO grants patents, a system which is one of the
major factors of economic growth." 55 It identified the danger of representatives
being encouraged to take on cases offering good short-term prospects rather than
cases with a long-term outcome. According to the Commission,
51. Id. The Commission views advertising as "cover[ing] not only accurate information for the
user but also a promotion of the services on offer, including comparison with a competitor ....
[M]embers of a profession should have the freedom to actively seek out clients without thereby
directly jeopardising the quality of the personal relationship between service providers and their
clients." Id. 41 (alteration to original text).
52. On appeal, the Court of First Instance found the Commission had misunderstood the extent
of the restriction on advertising and overturned its decision. Id. 43.
53. Id. 38.
54. Id. 40 (footnote omitted).
55. Commission Decision 36/147, supra note 50, 35 (emphasis added).
2008]
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Even if in other circumstances it might constitute a restriction of competition
to prohibit fees from being determined according to outcome, it is necessary
in the economic and legal context specific to the profession in question in
order to guarantee impartiality on the part of the representatives and to
ensure the proper functioning of the EPO. 56
Here, portraying a broad economic vision of the importance of patents to the
entire economy allowed the Commission to carve out a particular approach to fee
setting by one type of professional regulator on which was bestowed a somewhat
ethical veneer with the mention to guarantee impartiality.
The most challenging ECJ judgment on the applicability of Article 81 EC to
restrictions on learned professionals is Wouters. This judgment was issued
after an Article 234 EC 58 reference on regulations of the Netherlands Bar
Association prohibiting all contractual arrangements between lawyers practising
in the Netherlands and accountants which provided in any way for shared
decision making, profit sharing or for the use of a common name.59  The
referring tribunal (Raad van State) found that the aim of the measure was "to
safeguard the independence and loyalty to the client of members of the Bar who
provide legal assistance .... ,60 The ECJ decided that this type of rule does not
violate Article 81(1) EC because the association "could reasonably have
considered that that regulation, despite the effects restrictive of competition that
are inherent in it, is necessary for the proper practice of the legal profession . .
in the Netherlands.
61
The ECJ cited potential pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects of the
rule including its effects on the structure of competition. It accepted that:
[U]nreserved and unlimited authorisation of multi-disciplinary partnerships
between the legal profession, the generally decentralised nature of which is
closely linked to some of its fundamental features, and a profession as
concentrated as accountancy, could lead to an overall decrease in the degree
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Case C-309/99, Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 2002
E.C.R. 1-1577, 3.
58. Article 234 allows, and in some cases requires, a national body to refer to the ECJ questions
of the interpretation of EC law. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) art. 234.
59. In effect this rule renders any form of effective partnership difficult. Wouters, 2002 E.C.R.
1- 1577 84.
60. Id. 39. This finding precluded the ECJ examining the argument that it had an anti-
competitive object. See id. 72.
61. Id. 110.
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of competition prevailing on the market in legal services, as a result of the
substantial reduction in the number of undertakings present on that market.
62
It also commented that the one stop advantages of combining complementary
accountancy and legal expertise to offer a wider range of services and satisfy
"needs created by the increasing interpenetration of national markets and
consequent necessity for continuous adaptation to national and international
legislation" supported the conclusion that the rules prohibiting absolutely all
forms of cooperation restricted competition.
63
The key passage is contained in paragraph 97. The ECJ stated:
However, not every agreement between undertakings or every decision of an
association of undertakings which restricts the freedom of action of the parties
or of one of them necessarily falls within the prohibition laid down in Article
85(1) of the Treaty. For the purposes of application of that provision to a
particular case, account must first of all be taken of the overall context in
which the decision of the association of undertakings was taken or produces
its effects. More particularly, account must be taken of its objectives, which
are here connected with the need to make rules relating to organisation,
qualifications, professional ethics, supervision and liability, in order to ensure
that the ultimate consumers of legal services and the sound administration of
justice are provided with the necessary guarantees in relation to integrity and
experience. It has then to be considered whether the consequential effects
restrictive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those objectives. 64
It is, to say the least, interesting that having established the possibility of anti-
competitive effects; the ECJ did not find an infringement of Article 81(1) EC.
Instead, it advocates that a broader frame be established around the inquiry in
order to take account of the "overall context in which the decision of the
association of undertakings was taken or produces its effects .... ,65 The
emphasized words show the breadth of the relevant overall context includes,
firstly, the taking of the decision and, secondly, the effects of the decision. The
first focus admits non-competition justifications (e.g. requirements of the
62. Id. 93.
63. Id. 88.
Nevertheless, in so far as the preservation of a sufficient degree of competition
on the market in legal services could be guaranteed by less extreme measures
than national rules such as the 1993 Regulation, which prohibits absolutely any
form of multi-disciplinary partnership, whatever the respective sizes of the
firms of lawyers and accountants concerned, those rules restrict competition.
Wouters, 2002 E.C.R. 1-1577 94.
64. Id. 97 (parenthetical omitted).
65. Id. 3 (emphasis added).
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
operation of the organization). The second focus on effects does not specify
which effects are relevant. Next, the ECJ requires that account be taken of the
objectives of the decision and lists objectives that are not related to competition,
but comprise the interests of the restrainor (organization, supervision) and the
public/consumers (qualifications, ethics, liability, sound administration of
justice). Finally, the ECJ's approach asks about the inherency of the restrictive
effects in the pursuit of the restraints' objectives.
A variety of descriptive labels have been ascribed by commentators to the
ECJ's approach in this case. For Richard Whish, the ECJ approach is one of
"regulatory ancilliarity. ' 66  The tag of "regulatory" is interesting because it
introduces a somewhat paternalistic element. Disagreeing with the ancilliarity
prism, Giorgio Monti traces the transposition into Article 81(1) EC from the
Cassis de Dijon rule, which hinders the free movement of goods, is not
prohibited by "Article 28 if it is necessary to satisfy a mandatory requirement
relating to, for example, fairness of commercial transactions or the defence of the
consumer."'6 7 Terming this development as European-style rule of reason, it
allows an anti-competitive agreement necessary to preserve a domestic
mandatory requirement of public policy. Monti views this judgment as
exemplifying Mortelmans convergence in the application of rules on free
movement and competition. In Monti's view, the purpose of convergence in
Wouters is to permit account to be taken of non-competition factors relating to
domestic interests. Admitting different national interests along the mutual
recognition pathway could well dilute a uniform EU wide attitude to restrictions
on professional services.
Alternatively, D.G. Goyder viewed the Wouters judgment in terms of
conflating Articles 81(1) and 81(3) EC which he regarded as a possible foretaste
of the then future post May 2004 scenario.6 8 Jones and Sufrin point out that the
66. "What was is of interest about Wouters, however, is that the restriction in that case was not
necessary for the execution of a commercial transaction or the achievement of a commercial
outcome in the market; instead it was ancillary to a regulatory function .... RICHARD WHISH,
COMPETITION LAW 121, 121-22 (5TH ed., 2003) (emphasis in original).
67. Giorgio Monti, Article 81 EC and Public Policy, 39 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1057, 1087
(2002).
68. D.G. GOYDER, EC COMPETITION LAW 94-95 (4th ed., 2003) (stating:
What appears to have happened is that the two parts of the Article [81(l) and
Article 81(3)] have been conflated and operated as if they were a single
provision (in the same way as under section I of the Sherman Act in a case like
California Dental Assoc. v. FTC). This may become the usual method of
applying Article 81 from I May 2004 once the modernization programme has
been implemented and after the Commission has surrendered its monopoly of
granting individual exemptions. It is certainly not to be regarded as an
application of the 'rule of reason'.)
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ECJ did not say that rules regulating the provisions of professional services fall
outside Art 81(1) EC (like it did in Albany for collective bargaining). They
remark on how, at first sight, the ECJ went further than US courts because it
"seemed to weigh the anti-competitive effects of the agreement against benefits
which were not economic benefits" under Article 81 (1) EC. Without doubt, the
Wouter's judgment embraces and gives weight to non-competition criteria under
Article 81 (1) EC to a greater extent than earlier judgments and decisions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Wouters judgment has been described as "surprising and
controversial", 6 9 "puzzling" 70 and "difficult." 7 1 In my opinion, this judgment
suggests that the ECJ may tolerate restrictions on professionals that the
Commission would not favour. If so, that divergence of view explains the
Commission's enthusiasm for non-enforcement or informal measures. The
formal jurisprudence examined in this article illustrates the complex tensions
involved in applying Article 81 EC to restrictions that regulate the market
behaviour of professionals. The less formal modes embrace a broader audience
of public and private actors than would occur in a formal procedure under
Articles 81 or 82 EC. Moreover, they encourage the Member States and their
regulatory agencies to take ownership of the Lisbon agenda. 72 The key strength
of the informal measures is the possibility of securing negotiated outcomes that
emerge from a process of critical self-reflection by the restraining entity. In this
light, the decision of the Commission not to rely solely on formal enforcement
measures but, additionally, to pursue legally softer but potentially more effective
initiatives must be seen as an informed strategic choice designed to secure the
competitiveness of professional services in the European Union.
(alteration to original) (footnote omitted).
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